The seller's own math checks out arithmetically. $500,000 SDE at a 3.0x multiple is $1,500,000, which matches the listing's stated valuation near $1.5 million exactly. Against that, the $800,000 asking price is 53.3% of the 3x-multiple valuation, close enough to the "half its value" framing that the headline claim holds up under a direct calculation, not just as a sales phrase. On the asking price itself, $800,000 over $500,000 SDE is a 1.6x multiple, a genuinely low multiple for a business of this revenue size, consistent with a seller under real pressure to close quickly rather than negotiate a full-value exit.

What the reconciliation cannot resolve: both the $500,000 SDE and the $5.5–6.0 million revenue range are stated "per ownership," with no EBITDA disclosed to check either figure against, and no supporting P&L, tax return, or bank statement referenced in the public listing. The 3x multiple itself is also asserted rather than sourced, with no comparable transactions, industry benchmark, or valuation methodology cited, unlike the BVR DealStats comps this publication has seen in stronger listings. The math is internally consistent. It is not independently verified. Points withheld: five points, for financials that are asserted rather than sourced, with no EBITDA or third-party figure to cross-check the SDE claim.

This is the pillar the distress narrative costs the most. The listing states the seller "will entertain any reasonable offer structured around injecting working capital," not a quantified seller note, not an earnout, not a stated percentage or term, and no SBA eligibility is mentioned despite the company holding two state contractor licenses that would typically qualify. More consequentially: the MCA debt that is the entire stated reason for the sale is never quantified anywhere in the listing. No current balance, no payoff amount, no statement of whether the buyer assumes it in an asset sale or whether it is satisfied from the $800,000 in proceeds before the seller receives anything. That is the single most important missing number in this deal, and it is not a small omission. It is the number the whole distress-sale narrative hinges on.

Points withheld: eight points. No quantified financing terms of any kind, and no disclosed balance or treatment for the specific debt instrument the listing itself cites as the reason for the sale.

This listing is unusually granular for a distressed-sale SMB acquisition: two named, checkable license numbers; a specific showroom investment figure ($300,000+); a specific inventory figure ($60,000); a specific receivables figure (~$1.5 million); a named reason for selling with a specific cause (internal theft); and a specific growth catalyst tied to a named weather event (Hurricane Helene). Nothing in the listing contradicts anything else in it, a genuine positive relative to several other listings sourced this week.

Points withheld: one point, because the $1.5 million receivables figure is given no aging schedule (30/60/90-day breakdown), which matters directly for the claim that a buyer could recover most of the invested capital within roughly 60 days, a claim this publication cannot check without that breakdown.

Florida General Contractor license CGC1537641 and Roofing license CCC1336861 are both real, government-issued license numbers of a form that is independently checkable against Florida DBPR's public registry (myfloridalicense.com) by license number, free, no login required. This publication did not complete that lookup within this review. The anonymized listing discloses license numbers but not the business or licensee name needed to cross-reference the DBPR record against anything beyond the number itself, but the fact that two specific, checkable numbers exist at all is a meaningfully stronger credential than the vast majority of SMB listings this publication reviews, which name no license at all.

Points withheld: four points, reflecting that the license numbers are disclosed but not independently confirmed active and in good standing within this review.

A 4.8-star Google rating across more than 75 reviews and a referenced BBB profile are specific, checkable claims rather than generic self-description.

Points withheld: three points, because the anonymized listing provides no business name, making independent confirmation of the rating and BBB status impossible before an NDA.

This is the weakest sub-pillar in the Dossier. No individual owner or principal is named anywhere in the listing. That absence matters more here than in a typical anonymized SMB listing, because the central fact of this deal is an internal theft, and the listing does not say who committed it, whether that person was an employee, a partner, or unrelated to current leadership, or whether the individual remains with the company. A buyer evaluating this deal is being asked to underwrite a governance failure without being told who was involved or what controls, if any, have changed since.

Points withheld: eight points, for the absence of any named, independently checkable principal, compounded by the unresolved detail of who was responsible for the theft this listing cites as its central fact.

The flood-protection product line, a Garrison dealership, $60,000 of on-hand inventory, and a cited "$2M pipeline" in the seller's stated growth plan, is tied to a specific, dated demand event (Hurricane Helene) rather than a generic market-tailwind claim. That specificity is a genuine positive: it is a named product, a named supplier relationship, and a named catalyst, which is more than most SMB acquisition listings offer for their stated growth thesis.

Points withheld: three points, because the "$2M pipeline" figure is asserted with no supporting detail (contracted vs. prospective, timeline, or conversion assumptions), and the listing's other named growth levers, turning on Facebook/Meta advertising, rebuilding the sales team, expanding into Lee and Collier counties, are all still unbooked possibilities rather than already-booked backlog.

A five-county Tampa Bay/Fort Myers service area, dual GC and Roofing licensure, and a diversified service mix (roofing, remodeling, flood protection) give the business more than one demand driver and more than one weather-exposure angle in a state where storm-driven repair and remodeling demand is a structural, recurring feature rather than a one-time event.

Points withheld: three points, because storm-driven remodeling demand cuts both ways. The same hurricane exposure that creates the flood-protection opportunity is a real revenue-volatility risk the listing does not address, and the home-improvement trade generally is more discretionary-spending-sensitive than the essential-service categories (plumbing, electrical) this publication has scored higher in other issues.

The listing states an internal theft led to high-interest merchant cash advance debt, and that this debt is the reason for the below-market price. It never states how much is owed, what the rate is, or whether the buyer assumes it. Get this number, in writing, before evaluating any other figure in this listing. It determines whether $800,000 buys a business free of that liability or a business still carrying it.

That distinction determines who is legally responsible for the MCA debt and any other liabilities tied to the theft. The listing does not specify, and it changes the actual economics of the deal materially.

Ownership states a buyer could recover most of the invested capital from ~$1.5 million in job receivables within roughly 60 days. Without a 30/60/90-day aging breakdown, there is no way to know how much of that $1.5 million is current, how much is already past due, and how much is realistically collectible at all.

Florida DBPR's public registry (myfloridalicense.com) allows a free license-number lookup with no login. Confirm CGC1537641 and CCC1336861 are active, in good standing, and attached to the entity actually being sold, before spending diligence time on anything else.

This is the single fact the listing omits that would most change how a buyer should read every other claim in it, including the SDE and revenue figures a departing, potentially compromised owner is reporting per ownership.

Revenue and SDE are seller-represented, with no EBITDA to check them. Request trailing bank statements or tax returns, not just the summary figures in the listing, especially given the disclosed governance failure.