Every figure the seller uses to justify the asking price checks out arithmetically. $235,411 forecast SDE at 4.25x is $1,000,497 and at 5.0x is $1,177,055 — both match the seller's stated range to within rounding. The same multiples against the $182,796 trailing SDE produce $776,883 and $913,980, again matching the seller's own disclosed comparison figures almost exactly. The seller also cites seven private home health transactions in BVR DealStats trading at 3.70x–4.50x MVIC/SDE, with the two Medicare-certified comparables at 4.09x and 4.50x specifically — an unusually transparent, checkable methodology for a $1 million listing. What the reconciliation surfaces, though, is that the pricing leans on the forecast, not the trailing number: the true trailing multiple is 5.47x, above every comparable the seller itself cites, including the top of the Medicare-certified comp range (4.50x), and the 5.0x top of the seller's own indicated range already exceeds the highest disclosed comp by half a turn. None of this means the price is wrong — a legally fixed supply is exactly the kind of structural fact that can justify pricing above historical comps — but a buyer underwriting this deal is paying for the FY2026 forecast to land, not for what the business has already produced.

Points withheld: three points for the forecast-vs-trailing gap itself, and no separate points withheld for arithmetic accuracy, since every number the seller supplies reconciles to the dollar.

Seller financing is offered but entirely unquantified — no percentage, no term, no rate — the same gap found in nearly every listing this publication reviews regardless of asset type. The stronger alignment mechanism here is non-financial: the Director of Nursing, who runs the clinical side of the business day to day, is named as committed to remaining post-close. For a service business where the owner is a non-clinician, that is a more consequential retention than a financing term would be, because it is the clinical relationships and compliance continuity — not the owner's own labor — that the buyer is actually acquiring.

Points withheld: no quantified seller note or earnout tying any portion of price to the FY2026 forecast actually being achieved, and no disclosed retention mechanism (bonus, equity, or otherwise) securing the Director of Nursing's stated commitment beyond a stated intention.

The financial disclosure here is genuinely deep for a confidential FSBO listing — trailing and forecast SDE, trailing and forecast revenue, a working capital target, a full payor list, and a self-supplied comparable-transaction range. Two things do not reconcile on a close read. First, the "current census of 134" stated in the company overview does not match the census growth narrative elsewhere in the same listing, which states average census reached 147 — a 13-patient gap with no date attached to either figure. Second, the market-data section states "certified supply is 141 agencies statewide" and separately cites "MDH's 2025 directory" as listing 144 agencies as of March 14, 2025 — a 3-agency gap between the listing's own headline figure and its own footnoted source. As a rough cross-check: at $122 revenue per visit against $1,267,731 forecast revenue, implied visit volume is approximately 10,391 visits per year — roughly 71 to 78 visits per patient annually, or a bit over one visit per patient per week. That is a plausible cadence for a blended skilled-nursing, aide, and homemaking book, and lends circumstantial support to the revenue figure even though the census inputs themselves don't cleanly reconcile.

Points withheld: three points, split between the unreconciled census figures and the unreconciled agency-count figures.

Enrollment dating back multiple decades with no majority-ownership change in the trailing 36 months is the specific fact that exempts this transaction from CMS re-enrollment review under 42 CFR §424.550(b) — and, per the listing, is also the fact that makes the certification transferable at all during a moratorium that otherwise blocks new entry entirely. That combination — old enough to be exempt from the lookback, active enough to still be generating referrals and billing seven payors — is close to the strongest tenure case a service-business acquisition in this framework can present.

One point withheld because the listing does not state an exact enrollment date, so "multiple decades" cannot be pinned to a specific year for independent verification against CMS's own public enrollment records.

The owner is explicitly non-clinical, and the person who actually runs patient care — the Director of Nursing — is described as tenured and committed to staying on post-close. That is a meaningful de-risking feature: a buyer is not acquiring a business where the clinical relationships walk out the door with a departing owner-clinician, which is a common failure mode in healthcare-services acquisitions.

Points withheld: the DON's tenure is described only as "tenured," not quantified in years, and no other named clinical or administrative staff are described, so the depth of the team below the DON is unknown.

This is a For Sale By Owner listing with no principal named. The seller describes themselves only as "entrepreneurs who have closed multiple M&A transactions" — a claim this publication cannot verify from the public listing, and one the two-point independent confirmation standard this publication applies to every named operator cannot be met against, because no name is given to check. That is standard for a confidential FSBO healthcare listing and not itself disqualifying, but it means every operational claim in this dossier — the census figures, the payor list, the DON's commitment — rests on seller representation until a subscriber reaches the NDA stage.

Points withheld: five points, reflecting the absence of any named, independently checkable principal.

The CMS moratorium is the dominant fact in this pillar and this dossier: as of three months before this issue's publication, no new Medicare home health enrollment can be created anywhere in the United States, for any operator. That converts an existing, transferable certification into a scarce asset by federal action, not by competitive execution — a structural tailwind this publication has not encountered in fourteen prior issues. Layered on top of that: Minnesota's 65-and-over population is projected to grow by 217,324 people from 2020 to 2030 (a figure that checks out against the state's own cited base and endpoint), disproportionately in rural counties where the state's own data shows 65+ shares running as high as 32.3% against a 16.6% state average — the demographic most likely to need home health services, concentrated in the counties with historically thinner provider coverage.

Points withheld: two points, because a moratorium that can be lifted in any six-month renewal cycle is a policy tailwind, not a permanent structural moat, and the listing does not address what happens to this deal's relative value if CMS reopens enrollment.

Minnesota's certified home-care provider count fell 52% from FY2022 to FY2024 following a 2021 assisted-living licensure law, and the moratorium now blocks any of the remaining agencies from opening new branches into the current agency's service area — both genuine, checkable supply constraints. Nationally, the market is sized at $120.7 billion in 2025 growing toward $200.7 billion by 2031 (an 8.84% CAGR, confirmed against the seller's own endpoints), against a backdrop of over 1,000 agency closures nationally since 2019.

Points withheld: three points. The state's own agency-count figures don't fully reconcile (141 versus 144, noted above), and Saint Paul, Minneapolis, Duluth, and Rochester alone already account for 28 of the state's certified agencies — meaning competitive density is concentrated in metro markets in a way the listing doesn't map against this specific agency's actual service radius.

A 4.25x multiple on forecast SDE becomes 5.47x on trailing actual SDE. Before valuing this deal, get the trailing twelve months of actual financials — not the forecast — and underwrite from there. If the FY2026 forecast is achievable, the seller's math holds; if it isn't, the buyer is materially overpaying relative to every comparable the seller itself cites.

"Current census of 134" and "average census grew to 147" are two different numbers with no dates attached to either. Get a patient census roster with as-of dates before valuing the revenue-per-patient economics.

The entire investment thesis rests on this agency's Medicare certification predating the 36-month lookback. That is not something a subscriber has to take on faith from the seller: CMS's public Provider of Services file and Care Compare database can confirm enrollment history for a given National Provider Identifier once the NPI is disclosed. Confirm this independently before spending diligence time or capital on anything else in this dossier.

Every operational figure here — census, payor mix, revenue per visit, the DON's tenure and commitment — is seller-represented in a confidential FSBO listing. None of it has been independently confirmed by this publication, and it should not be treated as confirmed by a reader either.

It is extendable in six-month increments with no stated expiration, which is a real, current structural advantage — but a policy reversal is a risk this deal's pricing does not appear to discount.