Four-year cash flows are published at the project level, the investor level, and per a hypothetical $50,000 position, net of fees, promote and transaction costs. Target return (8.0%) and accrual rate (9%) are both stated, and the gap between them is reconcilable to platform and administration fees. Coverage is comfortable on the disclosed numbers: Year 1 NNN rent and NOI are both $1,402,458, and project-level net cash flow of $345,246 in Year 1 runs approximately 2.2x the $160,000 preferred coupon, growing to $464,886 by Year 4 as 3% escalations compound.

Points withheld for the unresolved discrepancy between the 8% and 9% figures appearing without a clear bridge on the deal page itself, and for the first-distribution date conflict between sections — 12/2026 in Details, May 2026 in Distributions, both on the same page.

The capital stack ties to the dollar. LP equity of $5,714,177 plus GP equity of $660,823 plus preferred of $2,000,000 equals $8,375,000 in total equity; add $10,520,886 in debt and total capitalization is $18,895,886, matching the stated figure exactly, with Sources and Uses balancing at $21,730,000 on both sides. Debt terms are fully specified — lender, type, term, rate, swap, amortization, interest-only period, recourse — which is rare at this deal size.

The sponsor states the purpose in the header of Sources and Uses: the preferred equity will be used, in part, to pay back current common equity investors. The mechanics confirm it precisely — Sources lists LP and GP equity at $7,350,000 and $850,000; the capital stack shows those same positions $1,825,000 lower, the disclosed Common Equity Paydown line, pro rata to the dollar. That paydown equals 91.2% of the preferred raise amount. It is disclosed in plain language and reconcilable from published tables, more than most sponsors provide — but a preferred investor should understand that roughly half of the incremental funding this raise supports returns cash to investors who came before them.

Deducted for the LTV figures not reconciling against their own stated denominator. The footnote defines LTV as senior debt plus preferred, divided by original purchase price ($17,500,000) — run that way, leverage is 60.6% senior and 72.0% inclusive of preferred, not the disclosed 56.3% and 67%. Both disclosed figures instead match total capitalization ($18,895,886) as the denominator. Measured the way the footnote describes, leverage runs four to five points higher than presented.

The preferred position is real: priority on both operating cash flow and capital events, ahead of common equity. But distributions are expected monthly at the discretion of The Wideman Company, who may decide to delay them for any reason, including maintenance or capital reserves — and the 9% accrual is non-compounded, so a delayed distribution earns no return on the deferred amount. No cure provision, remedy on non-payment, forced-sale right, or consent threshold is disclosed on the deal page.

Deducted further because the senior loan's 60-month term from a February 2025 closing matures around February 2030, and the hold is modeled on four years — ending roughly mid-2030, at or just past loan maturity. Refinancing or disposition risk sits inside the investment window, beneath a position with no control over the timing of either.

A full fee schedule is published — one-time and recurring, dollar amounts and percentages, recipients named. One-time: a 1.87% acquisition fee (~$327,250) plus $1,500 per investor onboarded to RM Technologies. Recurring: a 3.50% asset management fee and a 4.00% property management fee, both to the sponsor, totaling roughly $105,000 in Year 1 — about 7.5% of revenue — plus $125 per investor per quarter to RM Technologies. That level of disclosure is unusual and earns real credit.

Deducted because the property management fee appears to duplicate an expense the NNN lease's own cash-flow footnote assigns to the tenant — utilities, taxes, property management fees, and insurance are all listed as tenant-borne — and for the combined recurring load running approximately 7.5% of revenue.

The Wideman Company clears this publication's two-confirmation-point standard comfortably. A third-party commercial real estate transaction database records the firm's acquisition of SunTrust Plaza at Church Street Station — a 317,560 sq ft office tower in Orlando — for $92,800,000 in February 2026, with International Bank of Commerce providing a $65,000,000 permanent loan. A financial data provider carries an independent company profile describing the firm as a real estate investment company specializing in single-tenant office and industrial buildings, and named principals Matthew Wideman and Christopher Wideman are individually traceable. The firm describes itself as second-generation, an affiliate of Susquehanna Holdings Ltd., with roughly 50 years of history and approximately $1.2 billion under management per its own materials.

No completed-deal list with realized returns against projections is publicly available — the same gap Dossier No. 001 recorded in Issue No. 001, and it remains unresolved. This is a substantial operating history evidenced at the portfolio level rather than the deal level, which is why it scores below the ceiling rather than at it.

Full marks — this offering sits squarely inside the operator's demonstrated specialty. Single-tenant office and industrial is the sponsor's stated core focus, and the firm's own announcements include the acquisition of a FedEx Ground distribution center in Bismarck, North Dakota — fully leased to FedEx Ground, developed in 2022. Single-tenant NNN industrial is the firm's product, not an adjacent one.

The Wideman Company also sponsored Dossier No. 001, the FedEx Ground portfolio in Louisville and Chattanooga reviewed in this publication's first issue. That deal scored 84 under the rubric as it stood at the time. This is the first repeat sponsor in fourteen issues.

Named principals are individually traceable across independent sources, and a repeat appearance in this publication is itself a transparency signal. Deducted for the three-million-square-foot discrepancy between the sponsor's own channels describing the portfolio — 7 MSF on the website and RealtyMogul page versus 4 MSF on the company profile page. Most likely a stale page, but an unverified claim stated three different ways is a disclosure quality issue on this framework.

Also deducted for the co-investment claim's softening footnote: Deal Highlights state the sponsor is co-investing and remains committed to doing so in every future deal, but the Sources and Uses footnote permits the sponsor's contribution to include friends-and-family or affiliated-fund capital rather than requiring balance-sheet capital — a different alignment mechanism than it first appears, and the footnote does not distinguish how much is which. One contextual note: the firm's leadership materials describe a strategic focus on distressed office assets, a different strategy from this stabilized NNN industrial recapitalization — not a negative given the Bismarck and Dossier No. 001 track record in this exact product, but a reason the Sources and Uses disclosure matters.

Gaia Herbs executed a ten-year NNN lease at the original February 2025 closing with 3.00% annual escalations — Year 1 $1,402,458 rising to $1,532,504 by Year 4, with NOI equal to revenue at every step since the tenant carries operating expenses. Against a two-to-four-year hold, five to seven years of lease term remain at exit, so a buyer at disposition acquires remaining contractual income rather than a re-tenanting problem. Gaia Herbs has operated in Western North Carolina for more than 30 years and, per sponsor materials, has invested over $12 million of its own capital into the facility's infrastructure and equipment — a switching cost well above the lease obligation and a genuine renewal argument beyond lease term alone.

Deducted for total single-tenant concentration with no corporate guarantee or credit rating disclosed — Gaia Herbs is privately held, and Dossier No. 001's FedEx Ground tenant, by comparison, carried a published investment-grade rating — and for a small-MSA location with thinner buyer depth at disposition than a primary logistics hub. The 21.46-acre site does support roughly 100,000 sq ft of future expansion, but that optionality accrues primarily to common equity on a longer horizon, not to a preferred position on this hold.

The senior loan is fixed for its full term via an interest rate swap purchased at closing, removing floating-rate exposure for the position's entire modeled hold — a real structural protection given today's rate environment.

Deducted because the fixed rate protects the property's debt service, not the preferred investor directly, and because the swap's cost is embedded in the 6.11% rate rather than broken out separately.

Entering a stabilized, already-leased asset with debt already closed removes acquisition and lease-up timing risk entirely.

Deducted because the senior loan's five-year term matures at or near the end of the stated hold window, placing refinancing timing risk inside rather than outside the investment period, and because Western North Carolina's 2024 flood damage is a regional risk factor the deal page does not address.

Every criticism above — the paydown, the LTV denominator, the property management fee, the maturity inside the hold — comes from documents the sponsor chose to publish. A sponsor who disclosed only a target return and a hold period would have avoided all four observations and scored lower on Structure while presenting a less examinable deal. That inversion is worth stating plainly: on this framework, the deals that look most criticized are frequently the ones disclosing most.

The position sits ahead of common on distributions and capital events but behind $10,520,886 of senior secured debt with 20% recourse to the sponsor. In a downside scenario, senior debt is repaid first and preferred equity is exposed before common equity is exhausted only in the sense that it has priority — it is still equity, and its 9% accrual is a claim on available cash flow, not a payment obligation enforceable like a note.

The four-year cash flow shows no capital expenditure line. On a 2019-delivered building under a NNN lease this is defensible in the near term, but no reserve schedule is published.

The 1.32x target equity multiple is driven by the coupon and return of capital, not by an exit valuation, so the preferred is less sensitive to cap rate movement than common equity would be. But the return of capital depends on a refinancing or sale that must clear the senior loan first, and the exit cap rate assumption is not disclosed.